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marital deduction and split-gift pro­
visions of the gift tax law. The pur­
pose was to give married residents of 
common law states approximately 
the same federal tax advantages that 
were available to married residents 
of community property states. 
Ordinarily, upon the death of a 
married resident of a community 
property state, only one-half of the 
community property is taxed in the 
decedent's estate. Section 2056 achieves 
approximately the same result for 
married residents of common law 
states by providing a deduction­
limited, in general, to the greater of 
$250,000 or one-half of the estate­
for the value of property interests in­
cluded in the decedent's gross estate 
that pass from the decedent to the 
surviving spouse. 
The surviving spouse's interest in 
community property is a fee interest 
that, if retained until death, will be 
subject to estate tax. ln order to mir­
ror this aspect of community proper-
! ty, section 2056 does not permit a 
marital deduction for life estates or 
. ' certain other so-called terminable in­
' 1 terests that would not be taxable in 
· / the surviving spouse's gross estate. 
1f an interest qualifying for the 
marital deduction has passed from 
the decedent to the surviving spouse, 
the deduction may not be waived in 
order to reduce the estate of the sur­
viving spouse or to obtain other tax 
advantages in the estate of the dece­
dent or the surviving spouse. Rev. 
Ru!. 59-123, 1959-1 C.B. 248. How-
ever, if the surviving spouse makes a 
qualified disclaimer of a property in­
terest that otherwise would pass 
from the deceased spouse, the dis­
claimed interest is not deemed to 
pass to the surviving spouse. §§2045 
and 2518 of the Code, to which all 
future section references will be 
made, unless indicated otherwise. 
The marital deduction is com­
puted on Schedule M. 
R 
ESIDENCE AND MARITAL 
STATUS • Except as  
otherwise provided by 
treaty, the marital deduction is avail­
able only in the estate of a decedent 
who was either a citizen or a resident 
of the United States at the time of 
death. §2106; Treas. Reg. §20.2056(a)­
l (a). The surviving spouse, however, 
need not be a citizen or a resident of 
the United States. Treas. Reg. §20. -
2056(a)-l (a). 
The decedent must have been 
married at the time of death and sur­
vived by the spouse. §2056(a). For 
purposes of section 2056, a legal 
separation does not terminate the 
marital status. S.Rep.No. 1013, 80th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1948). 
In order to compensate for the un­
availability of the marital deduction 
to nonresident aliens, for the estates 
of nonresident aliens dying after No­
vember 13, 1966, the Foreign in­
vestors Tax Act reduced the maxi­
mum rate of the estate tax from 77 
per cent to 25 per cent and increased 
the exemption from $2,000 to $30,000. 
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Pub. L. No. 89-809, 26 Stat. 861. The 
Tax Reform Act of 1976 increased the 
maximum tax rate to 30 per cent and 
replaced the $30,CXX> exemption with a 
unified credit of $3,600. §§210 l (d), 
2102(c). 
lf the order of death of the dece­
dent and the spouse cannot be estab­
lished by proof, a presumption that 
the spouse survived, created either 
by the decedent's will or by local law, 
will be given effect if it causes the mar­
ital deduction bequest to be included in 
the spouse's gross estate. Treas. Reg. 
§20.2056(e)-2(e); Estate of Gordon v. 
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 404 (1978), 
acq. 1979-1 C.B. l .  As to the effect 
of the Uniform Simultaneous Death 
Act on property held in tenancy by 
the entirety, see Rev. Ru!. 76-303, 
1976-2 C.B. 266. 
lf a state court with jurisdiction 
over the parties or the subject matter 
declares a divorce invalid, the Inter­
nal Revenue Service ("Service") will 
follow the decision for federal tax 
purposes. Rev. Rul. 67-442, 1967-2 
C. B. 65. A second marriage by either 
spouse will also be deemed invalid, 
and any bequests to the putative sec­
ond spouse will not qualify for the 
marital deduction. 
Not all courts have agreed with the 
Service that the second decree ren­
ders the divorce invalid for tax pur­
poses. Compare Borax' Estate v. 
Commissioner, 349 F .2d 666 (2d Cir. 
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 
(1966), Wondsel v. Commissioner, 
350 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1965), and 
Feinberg v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 
260 (3d Cir. 1952), with Gersten v. 
Commissioner, 267 F.2d 195 (9th 
Cir. 1959). However, the Service gen­
erally will not contest the validity of 
a divorce until a court of competent 
jurisdiction declares the prior divorce 
to be invalid. Rev. Rul. 67-442, 1967-2 
C.B. 65. 
I 
NCLUSION IN GROSS ESTA TE • 
A property interest cannot 
qualify for the marital deduc­
tion unless it is included in the dece-, 
dent's gross estate. §2056(a). 
Examples: 
A death benefit payable to the sur­
viving spouse under the decedent's 
noncontributory qualified pension 
or profit-sharing plan would not be 
included in the decedent's gross es­
tate because of section 2039(c). 
Thus, the benefit could not qualify 
for the marital deduction. 
When the surviving spouse owned a 
policy on the life of the decedent that 
was not transferred to him by the 
decedent within three years of death, 
the proceeds would not be included 
in the decedent's gross estate, and 
they could not, therefore, qualify for 
the marital deduction. 
A property interest passing to the 
surviving spouse as a surviving joint 
owner will qualify for the marital de­
duction only to the extent that the in­
terest is includable in the decedent's 
gross estate. 
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If a loss deductible under section 
2054 occurs with respect to a prop­
erty interest, the interest cannot 
qualify for the marital deduction to 
the extent of the loss. Treas. Reg. 
§20.2056(a)-2(b)(3). 
P 
ASSAGE TO SURVIVOR • 
To be deductible, the prop­
erty interest must "pass" 
or have "passed" from the decedent 
to the surviving spouse. §2056(a). 
An interest includable in the dece­
dent's gross estate may pass to the 
surviving spouse: 
• By bequest, devise, intestacy, dow­
er or curtesy, or election against the 
will; 
• As an appointee or taker in de­
fault under the decedent's exercise or 
nonexercise of a power of appoint­
ment; 
• By a lifetime transfer; 
• As the proceeds of life insurance 
on the life of the decedent; or 
• As a joint tenant with right of sur­
vivorship. §2056(e). 
Example 
H, D's surviving spouse and sole ex­
ecutor of D's estate, received from 
D's estate $10,000 in repaymentof a 
loan made by H to D during D's life­
time, and $5,000 as an executor's 
commission. Neither amount is con­
sidered as passing from D to H, and 
thus neither amount can qualify for 
the marital deduction in D's estate. 
However, both amounts may be de­
ductible under section 2053. 
An interest with respect to which a· 
qualified disclaimer is made by the 
surviving spouse in favor of another 
does not pass to the surviving spouse. 
§§2045, 2518. A disclaimer must be 
distinguished from acceptance of the 
. interest by the surviving spouse, fol­
lowed by a transfer. In the latter case, 
the interest does pass to the surviving 
spouse and may qualify for the mari­
tal deduction. The subsequent trans­
fer may be a taxable gift. 
Example 
H, D's surviving spouse, was entitled 
to a $10,000 bequest under D's will 
and to $50,000 as the sole beneficiary 
of a life insurance policy on the life 
of D owned by D. H disclaimed the 
bequest, which was added to the resi­
due, passing to D's son, S. H di­
rected the life insurance company to 
hold the $50,000 of insurance pro­
ceeds, pay the interest on this amount 
to him for life, and on his death, to 
pay the principal to S. The $10,000 
bequest is considered as having 
passed from D to S and thus cannot 
qualify for the marital deduction. 
The $50,000 of insurance proceeds 
are considered as having passed 
from D to H, thus qualifying for the 
marital deduction. For gift tax pur­
poses, H has made a gift to S of the 
remainder interest in the insurance 
proceeds. Upon H's death, the pro-
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ceeds of the insurance policy will be 
included in his gross estate, since the 
settlement option he elected consti­
tuted a transfer of the proceeds, with 
a retention of the right to the income 
for life. See §2036. 
At one time, an interest disclaimed 
by another in favor of the surviving 
spouse was not deemed to have passed 
from the decedent to the surviving 
spouse. However, in 1966, section 
2056 was amended to provide that in 
the case of a decedent dying on or 
after October 4, 1966, property pass­
ing to the surviving spouse as a result 
of a disclaimer by a third party may 
qualify for the marital deduction to 
the same extent as though the prop­
erty had passed to the spouse directly 
from the decedent. Although the 
Tax Reform Act of 1976 eliminated 
the special disclaimer rule in section 
2056, it substituted a general dis­
claimer rule that has the same effect, 
assuming the statutory requirements 
of a qualified disclaimer are met. 
§§2045, 2518. 
An interest acquired by the sur­
viving spouse in settlement of a con­
test of the decedent's will is consid­
ered to have passed from the dece­
dent to the surviving spouse if the ac­
quisition constituted a bona fide rec­
ognition of his rights in the decedent's 
estate, as distinguished from a dis­
guised gift to him from other benefi­
ciaries of the estate. Treas. Reg. 
§20.2056(e)-2(d)(2). See Farley v. 
United States, 581 F.2d 821 (Ct. Cl. 
1978); Bel v. United States, 452 F.2d 
683 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 
U.S. 919 (1972). A probate decree 
awarding the interest to the surviving 
spouse is evidence that the interest 
passed because of rights in the estate. 
However, a decree is neither essential 
nor conclusive. Treas. Reg. §20.205(i(e}-
2(d)(2); Estate.of Dutcher v. Com­
missioner, 34 T.C. 918 (1960); Estate 
of Barrett v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 
606 (1954). 
The interest must pass to the sur­
viving spouse as beneficial owner, 
whether outright or in trust for his 
benefit. An interest transferred to 
the surviving spouse as trustee for 
another or subject to a binding 
agreement to transfer the interest to 
another does not pass to the surviv­
ing spouse. Treas. Reg. §20.2056-
(e)-2(a). Cf McLean v. United States, 
65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,12,326 (6th Cir. 
1965), aff'g per curiam 224 F. Supp. 
726 (E.D. Mich. 1963); First Nat'/ 
Bank v. Nelson, 355 F.2d 546 (7th 
Cir. 1966). 
MOUNT OF DEDUCTION • 
Three limitations provide 
a ceiling on the maximum 
allowable marital deduction: 
• The marital deduction may not 
exceed the net value of the property 
passing to the surviving spouse. 
• The marital deduction may not 
exceed the greater of $250,000 or one 
half of the decedent's adjusted gross 
estate ("the Basic Limitation"). 
• The Basic Limitation is subject to 
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partial reduction if the decedent 
made after 1976 lifetime gifts to a 
spouse that did not exceed $200,000 
("the Gift Tax Limitation"). 
The net value limitation and the 
Basic Limitation are applied sepa­
rately, and the more restrictive of the 
two controls. The Gift Tax Limita­
tion is effective only in connection 
with the Basic Limitation. Stated 
differently, the marital deduction is 
limited to the lesser of the net value 
of the property passing to the surviv­
ing spouse or the Basic Limitation 
less the Gift Tax Limitation. 
NET VALUE 
The net value of an interest pass­
ing to the surviving spouse is the 
gross estate tax value-the date-of­
death value, alternate valuation date 
value, section 2032A value, or sec­
tion 2040(c) value-of the interest 
less any charges against the interest. 
Thus, for example, the gross value 
of the interest must be reduced by: 
• Any federal or local estate or in­
heritance tax payable, either under 
the will or applicable local law, out 
of the interest. §2056(b)(4)(A). If the 
executor is authorized to pay death 
taxes out of the marital share of the 
estate, the value of the interest pass­
ing to the surviving spouse must be 
reduced by the amount of those 
taxes, even if the executor actually 
pays the death taxes out of the non­
marital share and thus leaves the 
marital interest intact. Estate of 
Wycoffv. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 617 
(1973), aff'd, 506 F.2d 1144 (10th 
Cir. 1974); Rev. Rul. 79-14, 1979-1 
C. B. 309. Therefore, in order to 
maximize the marital deduction, 
usually the will should direct that 
federal and local death taxes be paid 
from the portion of the estate not 
qualifying for the marital deduction. 
See Dodd v. United States, 345 F.2d 
714 (3d Cir. 1965). In some cases, 
however, it may be preferable to 
forego the maximum marital deduc­
tion in order to take full advantage 
of the unified credit. 
• Any mortgage or other lien to 
which the interest is subject. §2056-
(b)(4)(B). However, if under the will 
or applicable local law, the estate is 
obligated to discharge the lien, then 
the amount of the lien is not deducted 
in valuing the interest. Treas. Reg. 
§20.2056(b)-4(b). 
• The value of any portion of the in­
terest or of any property owned by 
the surviving spouse, including any 
claims against the decedent's estate, 
that must be transferred to another 
or surrendered as a condition to tak­
ing the interest. United States v. 
Stapf, 375 U.S. 118 (1963); Treas. 
Reg. §20.2056(b)-4(b). 
• The value of any income from the 
interest that may be utilized to pay 
administration expenses during the 
period prior to the distribution of the 
interest to the surviving spouse or to 
a trust for his benefit. Treas. Reg. 
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§20. 2056(b)-4(a). Similarly, in valu­
ing a vested remainder passing to the 
surviving spouse, the actuarial value 
of the outstanding income interest 
must be deducted. Treas. Reg. §20. -
2056(b )-4( d). 
• The amount of administration ex­
penses chargeable under the will or 
applicable local law to a residuary 
bequest to the surviving spouse, even 
if the executor elects to deduct the 
expenses on the estate's income tax 
return. Estate of Roney v. Commis­
sioner, 33 T.C. 801 (1960), aff'd, 294 
F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1961). See also 
Ballantine v. Tomlinson, 293 F .2d 
311 (5th Cir. 1961). 
THE BASIC LIMITATION 
The Basic Limitation provides 
that the marital deduction may in no 
event exceed the greater of $250,000 
-subject to reduction in the case of 
community property-or one-half 
of the adjusted gross estate. §2056(c)­
(1 )(A). This formulation of the lim­
itation, provided by the Tax Reform 
Act of 1976, represents a liberaliza­
tion of prior law, which limited the 
deduction to no more than one-half 
of the adjusted gross estate. 
Generally speaking, the 1976 pro­
vision is effective for the estates of 
decedents dying after 1976. For de­
cedents dying before 1979, a special 
transitional rule generally continues 
the old law in the case of pre-1977 
wills and trusts expressing bequests 
in terms of a maximum marital de-
duction formula. Tax Reform Act of 
1976, §2002(d)(l )(B). 
Example 
D, who has not made any intervivos 
gifts to a spouse, dies, leaving an ad­
justed gross estate of $300,000. Un­
der D's will, a qualifying interest of 
$200,000 passes to the surviving 
spouse. Prior law would have limited 
the marital deduction to $150,000-
one-half the adjusted gross estate of 
$300,000. Current law allows a mari­
tal deduction of $200,000, the amount 
of the interest passing. 
Without Community Property 
1f no community property is in­
cluded in the decedent's gross estate, 
the adjusted gross estate generally 
equals the gross estate minus the ex­
penses, losses, and debts deducted 
by the estate under sections 2053 and 
2054. §2056(c)(2)(A). For marital 
deduction purposes, the adjusted 
gross estate is increased by any gen­
eration-skipping transfers of which 
the decedent is the deemed trans­
feror that occur at the same time as, 
or within nine months after, his 
death. §2602(c)(5)(A). 
The charitable deduction allowed 
by section 2055 is not subtracted in 
determining the adjusted gross es­
tate. Accordingly, transfers to char­
itable donees made within three years 
of death that are brought back into 
the gross estate by section 2035 may 
serve to reduce the estate tax liability 
by increasing the maximum marital 
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deduction. Estate of Russell v. Com­
missioner, 70 T.C. 40 (1978), acq. 
1979-1 C.B. 1 
Administration expenses deducted 
on the estate's income tax return are 
not subtracted from the gross estate 
in computing the adjusted gross es­
tate. Rev. Rul. 55-643, 1955-2 C.B. 
386. Cf. Jackson v. United States, 
376 U.S. 503 (1964). If payable from 
the marital share, however, these ex­
penses may reduce the value of the 
interest passing to the surviving 
spouse. See Estate of Roney v. Com­
missioner, 33 T.C. 801 (1960); Rev. 
Rul. 55-225, 1955-1 C.B. 460. 
Example 
The value of D's gross estate is 
$800,000. Deductions allowed on the 
estate tax return under sections 2053 
and 2054 for expenses, debts, and 
losses total $120,000. D's will pro­
vides for a bequest of $40,000 to a 
charitable organization, for which a 
deduction is allowed under section 
2055; a bequest of $400,000 to H, 
D's surviving spouse; and a bequest 
of the residue, after paying all fed­
eral and state death taxes therefrom, 
to S, D's surviving son. The adjusted 
gross estate is therefore $680,000-
$800,000 less $120, 000-and the 
Basic Limitation limits the marital 
deduction to $340,000-the greater 
of $250,000 or one-half the adjusted 
gross estate of $680,000. 1 f the be­
quest to H were only $250,000, then 
the marital deduction would have 
been $250,000. 
With Community Property 
Married residents of community 
property states have already accom­
plished a division of their commu­
nity assets. In order not to give com­
munity property state residents an 
advantage over common law state 
residents, the Code prevents the fur­
ther splitting of community property 
for marital deduction purposes by 
special rules applicable to the Basic 
Limitation. 
Thus, in the case of a decedent 
who has held community property 
with the surviving spouse, the ad­
justed gross estate is defined as the 
gross estate less the sum of all com­
munity property included in the gross 
estate and deductions attributable to 
the separate property under sections 
2053 and 2054, expressed algebraic­
ally as that portion of the deductions 
which bears the same ratio to the total 
deductions as the separate property 
in the gross estate bears to the total 
gross estate. §2056(c)(2)(B). There­
fore, if the decedent's gross estate 
consists solely of community prop­
erty, the adjusted gross estate will be 
zero. 
If, however, the decedent's gross 
estate includes some separate prop­
erty, there will be an adjusted gross 
estate equal to the value of the sepa­
rate property less the pro rata share 
of the deductions under sections 
2053 and 2054. In that event, either 
the decedent's separate property or 
his share of the community property 
may qualify for the marital deduc-
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tion, but in an amount no greater 
than one-half of the adjusted gross 
estate computed according to section 
2056(c)(2)(B) or $250, 000 less the 
community property adjustment, 
whichever is larger. 
Example 
The value of D's gross estate is 
$1,200,000, consisting of $800,000 
of separate property and $400,000 of 
D's share of community property. 
Deductions allowed on the estate tax 
return for expenses, debts, and losses 
total $180,000. D leaves his separate 
property to his son, S, and his com­
munity property to his surviving 
spouse, H. D's adjusted gross estate 
is $680,000, computed as follows: 
The gross estate of $1,200,000 less 
community property of $400,000 
equals $800,000. Subtracting the 
deductions attributable to the sepa­
rate property of $120,000-$800,000 
over $1,200,000 times $180,000 -
leaves an adjusted gross estate of 
$680,000. Although D left H $400,000, 
the allowable marital deduction is 
limited to $340, 000-one-half of 
$680,000. 
In computing the adjusted gross 
estate, certain pre-1927 California 
community property is treated as sep­
arate property, and certain separate 
property that resulted from the con­
version after December 31, 1941, of 
community property is treated as 
community property. §§2056(c)(2)­
(B) and (C). 
The $250,000 element of the Basic 
Limitation is similarly modified to 
take account of community property 
by reducing this amount by the ex­
cess of the community property in­
cluded in the gross estate over the 
deductions under sections 2053 and 
2054 attributable to the community 
property. §2056(c)( l )(C). 
Example 
The value of D's gross estate is 
$300,000, consisting of $200,000 of 
separate property and $100,000 of 
D's share of community property. 
Deductions allowed on the estate tax 
return for expenses, debts, and losses 
total $45,000. D leaves the commu­
nity property to his surviving son, S, 
and his separate property to his sur­
viving spouse, H. The Basic Limita­
tion for D's gross estate will be the 
greater of one-half of the adjusted 
gross estate or $250,000 less adjust­
ments for community property, 
computed as follows: 
From the gross estate of $300,000, 
subtract $100,000 of community 
property and $30,000 of deductions 
attributable to the separate proper­
ty-$200,000 over $300, 000 times 
$45, 000-for an adjusted gross 
estate of $170,000. The $250,000 
limitation adjusted for community 
property is $165,000, as the $100,000 
of excess community property minus 
$15 ,000 of deductions attributable to 
the community property-$ I 00,000 
over $300,000 times $45,000-is sub­
tracted from the initial limitation of 
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$250,000. The amount of the marital 
deduction will therefore be $165,<XX>, 
since the $250,<XX> limitation as ad­
justed for community property­
$165,000-is greater than one-half 
of the adjusted gross estate of 
$170,000-$85,000-but less than 
the net value of property passing to 
the surviving spouse-$200,<XX>. 
GIFT TAX LIMITATION 
In addition to liberalizing the es­
tate tax marital deduction, the Tax 
Reform Act of 1976 also eased re­
strictions on the gift tax marital de­
duction. Under prior law, the gift tax 
marital deduction was limited to half 
the value of qualifying gifts made to 
a spouse. This limitation was changed 
in 1976 to provide that the first 
$100,000 of qualifying gifts to a 
spouse made after 1976 be deducti­
ble in full; the next $100,<XX> not be 
deductible at all; and gifts made 
above $200,<XX> be deductible to the 
extent of half their value. §2523(a). 
Thus, a greater gift tax marital de­
duction is available for gifts to a 
spouse that total less than $200,<XX>, 
but once the aggregate gifts exceed 
$200,<XX>, the gift tax marital deduc­
tion is the same under current law as 
before 1976. 
Apparently, in liberalizing the 
estate tax marital deduction, Con­
gress was concerned that benefits 
would be duplicated unless this 
deduction was adjusted to take into 
account the liberalization of the gift 
tax marital deduction. Accordingly, 
section 2056(c)( l )(B) was added­
and amended by the Revenue Act of 
1978-to reduce the Basic Limita­
tion by the excess of the gift tax 
marital deduction allowed to the de­
cedent for post-1976 gifts over the 
gift tax marital deduction that would 
have been allowed to the decedent 
for post-1976 gifts if the deduction 
were limited to one-half of the value 
of the gifts to a spouse required to be 
reported on a gift tax return-the 
Gift Tax Limitation. 
Intervivos gifts that are included 
in the gross estate under section 2035 
are not taken into account for the 
purpose of computing the Gift Tax 
Limitation. If the post-1976 report­
able marital gifts do not exceed 
$200,000 in the aggregate, the 
amount computed under the Gift 
Tax Limitation will reduce both 
elements of the Basic Limita­
tion-the $250,000 element and the 
one-half of the adjusted gross estate 
element. Whichever element, as ad­
justed, is larger will be the Basic 
Limitation. 
Examples 
D dies on June I, 1981. His only in­
tervivos gift was a cash gift of 
$150,000 on February I, 1977, to his 
spouse, H. D's adjusted gross estate 
-which does not include the inter­
vivos gift, since it was made more 
than three years before death­
equals $400,000. D's will leaves 
$300,000 to H, with the residue to his 
son. The Gift Tax Limitation will re-
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duce the Basic Limitation by $25,CXX>, 
as follows: 
Since the gift tax marital deduc­
tion in respect of post-1976 gifts is 
the first $100,CXX> of gifts, with no 
further deduction until the aggregate 
post-1976 gifts exceed $200,CXX>, the 
excess of the gift tax deduction of 
$100, 000 over the $75, 000 that 
would have been allowable as a gift 
tax marital deduction if the deduc­
tion was limited to 50 per cent of the 
gifts to the spouse required to be 
reported on a return, would be 
$25,(XX) -the Gift Tax Limitation. 
The Basic Limitation as adjusted by 
the Gift Tax Limitation is $225,CXX> 
-the greater of $225,CXX> ($250,CXX> 
less $25,<XX>) or $175,CXX> (one-half 
of the adjusted gross estate of 
$200, (XX), less $25,CXX>). The marital 
deduction in respect of D's estate 
will be $225, 000, since the Basic 
Limitation as adjusted by the Gift 
Tax Limitation-$225,000-is not 
more than the net value of the prop­
erty passing to the surviving spouse 
-$300,<XX>. 
Had D died on June l ,  1977, instead 
of June l ,  1981, since the $150,CXX> 
intervivos gift is included in D's 
gross estate, there would be no Gift 
Tax Limitation to reduce the Basic 
Limitation. Assuming that the sec­
tion 2035(c) gross-up is not a factor, 
D's adjusted gross estate would be 
increased from $400,CXX> to $550,CXX> 
as a result of section 2035(a). The 
Basic Limitation would be $275,CXX> 
-the greater of $250,<XX> or one-half 
of the adjusted gross estate-and 
since the Basic Limitation would not 
exceed the net value of property 
passing to the surviving spouse­
$300, 000-the marital deduction 
would be $275,CXX>. 
The same facts as in the previous Ex­
ample, except that D makes one ad­
ditional cash gift to H of $3,CXX> on 
February l ,  1978. Since the 1978 
gift is not more than $3, CXX>, no gift 
tax marital deduction is allowable 
with respect to it and D is not re­
quired to include it in a gift tax 
return. See §6019(a). Thus, that gift 
will have no effect on the computa­
tion of the Gift Tax Limitation. 
F 
ORM OF TRANSFER • The 
qualifying interest may pass 
to the surviving spouse ei­
ther outright or, subject to the ter­
minable interest rule, in trust. A 
transfer by will, whether outright or 
in trust, usually takes one of three 
forms: 
• A transfer of specific property, 
such as a bequest of 100 shares of 
corporate stock or a devise of Black­
acre; 
• A pecuniary bequest, payable in 
cash or in kind, such as a bequest of 
$100,CXX>; or 
• A transfer of a fractional share or 
the entirety of a residuary estate, 
such as a bequest of one-half of the 
residuary estate. 
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The amount of a pecuniary be­
quest or the size of a fractional share 
of the residue may be either specified 
or defined by a formula. A formula 
is frequently used to achieve a total 
marital deduction precisely equal to 
one-half of the adjusted gross estate, 
including nonprobate assets like life 
insurance and joint property that 
qualify for the marital deduction. 
Subject to specific exceptions, no 
marital deduction is allowed if the 
transfer to the surviving spouse is ex­
pressed as a pecuniary bequest or gift 
that the executor or trustee is per­
mitted or directed to satisfy by a dis­
tribution in kind at federal estate tax 
values, unless either the will itself or 
local law provides one of several 
protective standards to insure that 
the surviving spouse will not be 
treated unfairly in the allocation of 
estate assets to his share of the estate. 
Rev. Proc. 64-19, 1964-1 C.B. 682. 
The ground stated for disallowing the 
deduction is that the interest passing 
to the surviving spouse would not be 
ascertainable as of the date of the 
decedent's death. See Polasky, Marital 
Deduction Formula Clauses in Estate 
Planning-Estate and Income Tax 
Considerations, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 
809 (1965). 
T 
ERMINABLE INTERESTS • 
The terminable interest rule 
seeks to exclude from the 
marital deduction an interest that 
would not be includable in the sur­
viving spouse's gross estate, though 
some interests that are includable 
may also be disqualified under the 
rule's technical provisions. See Jack­
son v. United States, 376 U.S. 503 
(1964). 
A "terminable interest" is an in­
terest that will terminate or fail with 
the lapse of time or upon the occur­
rence or nonoccurrence of an event 
or contingency. §2056(b)(I ). Exam­
ples are: 
• A life estate or an estate for a term 
of years; 
• An annuity; 
• A patent or copyright; 
• A widow's support allowance that 
would, under the applicable local 
law, terminate upon the widow's 
death or remarriage; and 
• A remainder contingent upon the 
remainderman's surviving the in­
come beneficiary. 
The Code states that a bond, note, 
or similar contractual obligation 
whose discharge would not have the 
effect of an annuity for life or for a 
term is not a terminable interest. 
§2056(b)(l). The difference between 
a note payable in installments with 
interest and an annuity for a term of 
years is not readily apparent. 
A self-liquidating mortgage is like 
an annuity for a term, but it is also 
like an installment note; consequent­
ly, it is uncertain whether it will be 
treated as a terminable interest. In all 
likelihood, any property interest that 
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expires after a stated period or upon 
the occurrence of a contingency will 
be treated as a terminable interest, 
unless expressly excluded by section 
2056(b)( l ). Not being expressly men­
tioned in section 2056(b)( l ), a self­
liquidating mortgage will probably 
be considered a terminable interest. 
The Service has recently ruled that 
an installment contract is a terminable 
interest. Rev. Rul. 79-224, 1979-2 
C.B. 334. 
A statutory widow's support al­
lowance of a specified monthly 
amount during the administration of 
the decedent's estate will constitute a 
terminable interest if, under local 
law, the allowance is terminated by the 
death or remarriage of the widow. 
However, if, under local law, the 
widow's support allowance indefeas­
ibly vests on the decedent's death 
and is payable irrespective of the 
widow's death or remarriage during 
the statutory period for which pay­
ment is to be made, the allowance 
will not be a terminable interest. 
Estate of Green v. United States, 441 
F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1971). See also 
Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 
503 (1964). 
Thus, the Sixth Circuit has al­
lowed a marital deduction for a 
widow's allowance because, under 
Miehigan law, the widow's right in­
defeasibly vested upon the husband's 
death, but it denied a marital deduc­
tion for a widow's allowance be­
cause Tennessee law does not give 
the widow an indefeasibly vested 
right to the allowance. Compare 
Estate of Green v. United States, 44 l 
F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1971), with Hamil­
ton Nat'/ Bank v. United States, 353 
F.2d 930 (6th Cir. 1965). 
If a widow renounces her deceased 
husband's will and elects to take a 
dower interest or a forced statutory 
share under state law, her share will 
qualify for the marital deduction if 
the interest she receives is not termin­
able. §2056(d)(3); Rev. Rul. 72-8, 
1972-1 C.B. 309. In many states, a 
widow's dower interest in realty is a 
life estate, which is a terminable in­
terest. If, under state law, a widow 
can elect to receive in lieu of dower a 
dollar amount equal to the com­
muted value of the dower interest, 
the amount paid to her will qualify 
for the marital deduction. Rev. Rul. 
72-7, 1972-1 C.B. 308, and cases 
cited therein. Also, an award of a 
dollar amount in lieu of a widow's 
homestead pursuant to state law 
qualifies for the marital deduction. 
Rev. Rul. 72-153, 1972-1 C.B. 309. 
DISQUALIFICATIONS 
Not all terminable interests are 
disqualified for the marital deduc­
tion. A terminable interest passing 
from the decedent to the surviving 
spouse is disqualified if: 
• An interest-whether or not in­
cluded in the decedent's gross es­
tate-in the same property from 
which the terminable interest was 
created passes or has passed-
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whether or not at the same time or 
under the same instrument-from 
the decedent to any person (''trans­
feree")-whether or not ascertain­
able-other than the surviving spouse 
or his estate; 
• The interest passes or has passed 
to the transferee for less than ade­
quate and full consideration in 
money or money's worth; and 
• The transferee, or his heirs or 
assigns, may possess or enjoy any 
part of the property after the termi­
nation or failure of the interest pass­
ing to the surviving spouse. §2056(b)­
( 1 )(A) and (B). 
Examples 
The decedent bequeathed his residu­
ary estate to his surviving spouse for 
her lifetime, with a remainder over 
to his children surviving her. (This 
bequest would have qualified for the 
marital deduction if the surviving 
spouse's estate, rather than the chil­
dren, was designated as the remain­
derman. ) 
The decedent bequeathed his residu­
ary estate to his mother for her life­
time, with the remainder over to his 
spouse if she survived the mother. 
The mother survived the decedent. 
(This bequest of a remainder interest 
to the spouse would have qualified 
for the marital deduction if the 
mother had predeceased the dece­
dent or if the spouse's remainder in­
terest vested on the decedent's death 
rather than being conditioned on the 
spouse's surviving the mother.) 
The decedent purchased a joint and 
survivor's annuity for himself and 
his spouse. The annuity contract 
provided that upon the death of the 
survivor of the decedent and his 
spouse, any excess of the cost of the 
contract over the total annuity pay­
ments previously made shall be re­
funded to the then living children of 
the decedent. (This annuity would 
have qualified for the marital deduc­
tion if the contract had not provided 
for a refund or if the contract had 
provided that any refund would be 
payable to the estate of the survivor 
of the decedent and his spouse.) 
The decedent gave Blackacre to his 
son, reserving the income therefrom 
for a period of 20 years and be­
queathing the estate for a term of 
years to his surviving spouse. (The 
estate for a term of years would have 
qualified for the marital deduction 
had the son paid fair value for the in­
terest acquired by him in Blackacre.) 
If a surviving spouse is required by 
the decedent's will to survive the 
period of administration of the dece­
dent's estate in order to receive a be­
quest, the bequest to the spouse will 
constitute a terminable interest and 
will usually not qualify for the mari­
tal deduction. Estate of Fried v. 
Commissioner, 445 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 
(1972). 
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A joint will for a husband and 
wife should be carefully drawn, since 
it may create contractual restrictions 
that will disqualify the surviving 
spouse's bequest for the marital de­
duction. Compare Estate of Krampf 
v. Commissioner, 464 F.2d 1398 (3d 
Cir. 1972), aff'g per curiam 56 T.C. 
293, Opal v. Commissioner, 450 
F.2d 1085 (2d Cir. 1971), and Estate 
of Goldstein v. United States, 72-1 
U.S. Tax Cas. �12,819 (D. Minn. 
1971), all of which denied a marital 
deduction, with Estate of Salvatore 
Aquilino, 31 T .C.M. (CCH)906 (1972), 
allowing a deduction. Similarly, in 
drafting reciprocal or mutual wills, 
care must be employed not to impose 
any contractual restrictions that might 
disqualify a bequest for a marital 
deduction. 
A terminable interest is also dis­
qualified if it is to be acquired for the 
surviving spouse, pursuant to direc­
tions of the decedent, by the dece­
dent's executor or trustee. §2056(b)­
( l)(C). The disqualification occurs 
even though no person other than 
the surviving spouse acquires an in­
terest in the property. 
Example 
D bequeathed $100,000 to H, the 
surviving spouse for whom the ex­
ecutor was directed to purchase a 
nonrefundable life annuity with this 
money. The bequest does not qualify 
for the marital deduction. The result 
would be the same if the executor 
was directed to purchase a patent, 
copyright, or, probably, a self-liqui­
dating mortgage for H. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In order to permit certain conven­
ient dispositive arrangements, the 
Code makes three exceptions to the 
terminable interest rule: 
Death of Surviving Spouse 
An interest passing to the surviv­
ing spouse is not considered a ter­
minable interest solely because it will 
terminate or fail upon the death of 
the surviving spouse within a period 
not in excess of six months after the 
decedent's death or as a result of a 
common disaster resulting in the 
death of the decedent and the surviv­
ing spouse, if the termination or 
failure does not, in fact, occur. §2056-
(b )(3). The proper method of com­
puting the six-month period is dis­
cussed in Rev. Rul. 70-400, 1970-2 
C.B. 196. 
Because of the risk that a condi­
tion that the spouse must survive for 
a period of six months might not 
comply with section 2056(b)(3) as a 
consequence of the manner in which 
the period is measured under local 
law, conservative drafting practice 
will limit a survivorship requirement 
to no more than five months. 
Examples 
D, by will, leaves to H, the surviving 
spouse, a life estate in Greenacre, 
with the remainder to X. D's will 
provides that H shall have no interest 
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in Greenacre if he dies within five 
months after D. H, in fact, survives 
D by more than five months. Since 
the contingency specified in the sur­
vivorship clause-death within five 
months-did not, in fact, occur, the 
survivorship clause does not prevent 
qualification for the marital deduc­
tion. However, the failure of the 
contingency to occur cannot convert 
an otherwise nondeductible termin­
able interest-a life estate with a re­
mainder over to a third person-into 
a deductible interest. Thus, H's in­
terest in Greenacre does not qualify 
for the marital deduction. 
D and his spouse, W, were injured in 
an automobile accident. As a result 
of injuries sustained, D died one 
week after the accident and W died a 
week after him. D's will left his en­
tire estate to W, with a proviso that if 
both D and W "die in a common 
disaster," the entire estate shall pass 
to D's son. Under the applicable 
local law, a husband and wife are 
deemed to have died in a common 
disaster if they both died within 30 
days after a common accident and 
injuries sustained in the accident 
contributed to their death. No mari­
tal deduction is allowed in D's estate, 
since the contingency specified in the 
common disaster clause did, in fact, 
occur. If, however, W had recovered 
from her injuries, she would have 
received D's estate, and the bequest 
to her would have qualified for the 
marital deduction. 
The marital deduction will be dis­
allowed if, at the time of the final 
audit of the decedent's return, the 
surviving spouse may possibly be de­
prived of the interest passing to him 
that is subject to a common disaster 
provision-as distinguished from the 
six-month survivorship provision­
because of the construction of the 
common disaster provision under 
applicable local law. Treas. Reg. §20.-
2056(b)-3(c). For this, and other rea­
sons, a common disaster clause fre­
quently is a poor drafting tool. 
Power of Appointment 
An interest, whether passing out­
right or in trust, will not be treated as 
a terminable interest if: 
• The surviving spouse is entitled 
for life to all the income from the in­
terest, or from a specific portion 
thereof, payable annually or at more 
frequent intervals; 
• The surviving spouse has the 
power, exercisable by him alone and 
in all events, to appoint the entire in­
terest, or a specific portion thereof, 
to himself or to his estate; and 
• There is no power in any person 
other than the surviving spouse to 
appoint any part of the interest to 
any person other than the surviving 
spouse. Treas. Regs. §§20.2056(b)-5-
(a)( l ), (2), (4), and (5); Rev. Ruis. 
66-38, 1966-1 C.B. 212, 66-39, 1966-
1 C.B. 223. 
The surviving spouse's general 
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power of appointment may be exer­
cisable during lifetime or by will, or 
both. A surviving spouse who pos­
sesses the requisite power of appoint­
ment may also hold lesser powers 
without disqualifying the trust. Treas. 
Reg. §20.2056(b)-5(g)(5). A person 
other than the surviving spouse may 
hold a power of appointment over 
the interest, provided that this power 
is exercisable solely in favor of the 
surviving spouse. 
Example 
The decedent bequeathed $500,000 
in trust for the benefit of the surviv­
ing spouse. The trustee was directed 
to pay to the spouse all the trust in­
come, at least annually, for life and 
to apply principal in amounts suffi­
cient to meet expenses of illness or 
other emergencies. In addition, the 
trustee was authorized to pay or ap­
ply such additional amounts of prin­
cipal as the trustee determined to be 
in the best interest of the spouse. In 
any year in which trust income was 
less than $20,000, the spouse had the 
right to draw from the principal of 
the trust the difference between the 
trust income from that year and 
$20,000. The spouse was given the 
power to appoint by will to the 
spouse's estate or to any other ap­
pointee any trust principal remaining 
at the spouse's death. To the extent 
that the spouse did not exercise this 
power, the remaining trust principal 
was to be distributed to the children 
of the decedent surviving the spouse. 
The grant of administrative powers 
to the trustee of a marital trust may 
disqualify bequests to the trust if the 
exercise of the powers could deprive 
the surviving spouse of the beneficial 
enjoyment required by the statute. 
See Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-5(f)(4); 
Rev. Rul. 69-56, 1969-1 C.B. 224. 
Several cases decided under the tax 
law prior to the Tax Reform Act of 
1969 denied a charitable deduction 
for a remainder interest in a trust be­
queathed to a qualified charity be­
cause of the administrative powers 
granted the fiduciary, such as the un­
restricted power to allocate receipts 
between income and corpus combined 
with a power to invest in mutual 
funds or in wasting assets without es­
tablishing a reserve or sinking fund. 
Detroit Bank & Trust Co. v. United 
States, 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 112,886 
(6th Cir. 1972); Atwell v. United 
States, 339 F. Supp. 425 (S.D. Tex. 
1972). 
Nonetheless, if the fiduciary's ad­
ministrative powers are sufficiently 
restricted under local law to preclude 
him from manipulating the trust in­
come to the detriment of the surviv­
ing spouse, the administrative powers 
should not adversely affect the claim 
for a marital deduction. Cf &tate 
of Toulmin v. United States, 462 
F. 2d 978 (6th Cir. 1972). Still, great 
care should be taken drafting the ad­
ministrative powers granted the fidu­
ciary under the testator's will. 
The testator's will should include 
a provision stating his intention that 
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the bequest to the surviving spouse 
qualify for the marital deduction. 
Then, should the bequest to the spouse 
be made in trust and fail to qualify 
for the marital deduction under one in­
terpretation of an ambiguous clause 
in the trust but not under another, 
the statement of the testator's intent 
might well induce a court to adopt 
the more favorable construction as 
reflecting his probable intent. 
Thus, in Virginia Nat'/ Bank v. 
United States, 443 F.2d 1030 (4th 
Cir. 1971), the court relied on parol 
evidence of the testator's intent to 
qualify a bequest for the marital 
deduction, even though a forfeiture 
provision in the trust that would 
have disqualified the bequest for a 
marital deduction was thereby in­
validated. Earlier, however, the 
Fourth Circuit had declined to give 
any weight to the testator's intention 
to qualify a bequest for the marital 
deduction. Estate of Pierpont v. 
Commissioner, 336 F.2d 177 (4th 
Cir. 1964). See Guiney v. United 
States, 425 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1970); 
Frank v. Frank, 253 Md. 413, 253 
A.2d 377 (1969). 
Insurance or Annnity Proceeds 
An interest in the proceeds of a 
life insurance, endowment, or annui­
ty contract will be treated as passing 
solely to the surviving spouse if, 
under the contract, while the pro­
ceeds are being held by the insurer, 
the surviving spouse has the right to 
the interest on, or the installment pay-
ments of, the proceeds for life and 
the right to appoint to himself or to 
his estate the unpaid proceeds or in­
stallment payments. §2056(b)(6). 
These requirements concerning the 
spouse's income interest and general 
power of appointment are substan­
tially the same as the requirements 
under section 2056(b)(5). For the ef­
fect of formal limitations on the sur­
viving spouse's right of withdrawal, 
compare Estate of Jennings v. Com­
missioner, 39 T.C. 417 (1962), acq. 
1964-1 C.B. 4, and Estate of Corn­
well v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 688 
(1962), acq. 1964-l C.B. 4, with 
Werbe's Estate v. United States, 273 
F.2d 201 (7th Cir. J959). 
The life estate power of appoint­
ment exceptions to the terminable in­
terest rule are considered in great de­
tail in Treas. Regs. §§20.2056(b)-5 
and 6. They should be studied before 
attempting to draft a will or a trust 
provision complying with section 
2056(b)(5) or giving an opinion on 
whether the settlement provisions of 
a life insurance, endowment, or an­
nuity contract meet the requirements 
of section 2056(b)(6). Furthermore, 
whether the provisions of a will, 
trust, or contract meet the require­
ments of sections 2056(b)(5) or (6) 
must be determined by construing 
the provisions according to the ap­
plicable local law and in the context 
of the entire instrument. 
SPECIFIC PORTIONS 
A specific portion of an interest 
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may qualify under sections 2056(b)(5) 
or (6). The term "specific portion" 
means a specified fractional share, as 
distinguished from a specified amount. 
Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-5(c). 
In Northeastern Nat'/ Bank, 387 
U.S. 213 (1967), the Court invalidat­
ed the regulatory definition of "spe­
cific portion" as applied to the re­
quirement under section 2056(b)(5) 
that the surviving spouse be granted 
all the income from a specific por­
tion of the property passing from the 
decedent. The decedent had made a 
testamentary bequest to a trust 
under the terms of which his widow 
was to receive $300 a month for the 
rest of her life. Upon the widow's 
death, she was empowered to ap­
point the entire corpus of the trust by 
will. The Court held that a deter­
mination should be made of the 
amount of trust principal that would 
produce an income of $300 per 
month on the basis of a reasonable 
rate of return. That amount of prin­
cipal, though unspecified in the will, 
would qualify for the marital deduc­
tion. The case was remanded to the 
district court to select a proper rate 
of return and to compute the amount 
of the deduction. Accord, Citizens 
Nat'/ Bank v. United States, 359 
F.2d 8I7 (7th Cir. I966); Gelb v. 
Commissioner, 298 F . 2d 544 (2d Cir. 
1962). 
There is a difference between 
granting the surviving spouse the in­
come from a fractional share of a 
trust and granting an unvarying 
amount of income. In the first situa­
tion, the spouse's income may fluc­
tuate as the trust assets appreciate or 
decline in value, while in the second 
situation the spouse is not affected 
by the rise and fall in the value of the 
trust assets. The Supreme Court, 
however, rejected the argument that 
Congress was concerned with this 
distinction when it enacted the mari­
tal deduction provision. 
Section 2056(b)(5) also permits the 
decedent to grant the surviving 
spouse a power of appointment over 
a specific portion of the trust assets. 
If the term "specific portion" refers 
only to a fractional share, as the 
Treasury Regulations provide, the 
value of the assets subject to the 
power will fluctuate according to 
changes in market value, and in view 
of the present inflationary spiral, the 
amount included in the surviving 
spouse's gross estate at his death will 
probably be larger than the amount 
of the deduction granted the dece­
dent. But if the term includes a 
power over a dollar amount of 
assets, the value to be included in the 
surviving spouse's gross estate on his 
death will be equal to the deduction 
granted the decedent. 
In Northeastern Nat'/ Bank v. 
United States, 387 U.S. 213, 224-25 
(1967), the Court noted that the con­
struction of the term "specific por­
tion" for purposes of the power of 
appointment requirement might dif­
fer from the construction adopted by 
the Court for purposes of applying 
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the current income requirement. The 
Court did not need-and it expressly 
deelined-to resolve that question, 
since the widow in Northeastern had 
a testamentary power to appoint the 
entire trust corpus. Consequently, 
the meaning of "specific portion" 
remains unsettled as to the power of 
appointment provision. 
Examples 
D made a testamentary transfer of 
$200,000 to a trust which provided 
that D's spouse, H, was to receive 
$300 a month for the rest of his life 
and have a testamentary general 
power of appointment over the en­
tire corpus. The amount of trust cor­
pus that will produce income of $300 
a month determined at some appro­
priate rate of return will qualify for 
the marital deduction, but the rest of 
the trust assets will not. 
D made a testamentary transfer of 
$200,000 to a trust which provided 
that D's spouse, H, was to receive all 
the income from the trust, payable 
monthly, for the rest of his life. H 
was also granted a testamentary gener­
al power of appointment over $100,<XX> 
of trust assets. Treas. Reg. §20.2056-
(b)-S(c) denies any marital deduction 
to D's estate for this bequest, and the 




• If the interest passing to 
the surviving spouse may 
be satisfied out of assets that would 
not have qualified for the marital 
deduction had they passed specifical­
ly from the decedent to the surviving 
spouse, then, for the purpose of 
computing the marital deduction, 
the value of the interest passing to 
the surviving spouse must be reduced 
by the value of the nonqualifying 
assets. §2056(b)(2). 
Example 
D bequeathed one-half of the 
residuary estate, worth $80,000, to 
H, the surviving spouse. Included in 
the residuary estate is an estate for a 
term of years, worth $20,000, that 
was reserved by D in a lifetime gift to 
his son. If, under the will and appli­
cable local law, D's executor could 
allocate the entire estate for a term of 
years to H, then, whether or not the 
executor allocates that estate for a 
term of years to H, for purposes of 
the marital deduction, the value of 
the bequest to H must be reduced by 
$20,000 to $60,000. If, under the will 
and applicable local law, the ex­
ecutor could allocate to H only an 
undivided one-half interest in the 
estate for a term of years, then the 
value of the bequest would be re­
duced by $10,000 to $70,000. 
On the other hand, if D's will had 
directed that any interests not quali­
fying for the marital deduction 
should not be allocated to H's share 
of the estate, then no reduction 
would have been required. Treas. 
Reg. §20.2056(b)-2(d). 
